On June 30, 2026, the U.S. government launched a coordinated financial and law enforcement operation against a fuel theft network operated by the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). The action, carried out by several U.S. agencies in coordination with Mexico's Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF), targeted two Mexican nationals and nine entities involved in the network.
This action is directed at disrupting the cartel's transnational operations on both sides of the border by targeting fuel smuggling, falsified customs documents, and shell companies operating as part of a transnational criminal enterprise.
What Is “Huachicol Fiscal” (Fiscal Fuel Theft)?
Fuel theft in Mexico has long been a major source of criminal revenue for different cartels.It gained greater relevance after 2014 in the state of Guanajuato and the so-called Red Triangle, which encompasses the state's geography and its network of fuel pipelines.
However, as regulations tightened and profit margins increased, this criminal enterprise evolved from the local theft and sale of gasoline through clandestine vendors into a multinational network of companies operating across different countries.
In recent years, cartels and brokers involved in these activities (huachicoleros) have increasingly purchased and smuggled fuel from the United States into Mexico, where it is sold on the Mexican black market. Recent estimates indicate that between one-third and one-half of all fuel consumed in Mexico is linked to the illicit fuel smuggling trade.
A Criminal Crisis Announced
Following the enactment of Mexico's energy overhaul in 2013 under President Enrique Peña Nieto, the government intended to: (1) end energy subsidies; (2) increase the IEPS tax rate on fuel imports; and (3) allow Mexican, U.S., and other international energy companies to obtain permits facilitating U.S.-Mexico energy trade.
All Mexican companies importing fuel must obtain a permit from Mexico's Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía, SENER) and pay the IEPS tax as a licensed fuel importer. However, SENER does not authorize these companies to wholesale fuel within Mexico. To sell imported fuel to other Mexican companies, they must obtain an additional permit from Mexico's National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía, CNE) to store, transport, and ultimately commercialize it within Mexico.
This created a bottleneck in Mexico's wholesale fuel market because entities holding CNE permits are prohibited from importing fuel, while most Mexican companies do not possess both SENER and CNE permits. "In summary, companies involved in importing fuel into Mexico must hold a SENER permit, while companies involved in buying and selling fuel within Mexico must hold a CNE permit."
This changed under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). During his administration, the government rescinded most existing SENER licenses, restricted new SENER permits to a limited number of fuel importers, and further limited CNE authorizations. These policies reduced the legal supply of imported fuel and significantly limited the number of entities authorized to wholesale it, resulting in greater market concentration among a small number of energy companies.
Combined with the price spread between U.S. and Mexican fuel prices created by the IEPS tax, these conditions created a highly profitable opportunity for organized crime. Fuel purchased in the United States could be smuggled into Mexico without paying taxes and then wholesaled through entities linked to criminal cartels.
Breaking the Political-Criminal Pact
Since President Trump declared a national emergency at the U.S. southern border and expanded actions against the Mexican cartels, the U.S. government has sought to ensure the total elimination of the cartels and other Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) through their designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
This approach has prompted U.S. authorities not only to target the principal kingpins but also to disrupt the flow of money and the political protection these organizations receive within Mexican territory. Following financial investigations that identified fuel theft as the second-largest source of cartel revenue, criminal investigations linked these networks to major financiers of political campaigns in Mexico.
U.S. authorities have intensified their efforts to disrupt this source of revenue, thereby reducing the financial resources that allegedly sustain the political protection enjoyed by these criminal organizations.
Because the primary investigations and sanctions are directed at the CJNG and its allies within the CDG, the principal point of entry into Mexico is located in the state of Tamaulipas.
This development also coincides with two recent events in Tamaulipas: reports linking Governor Américo Villarreal to alleged negotiations involving Mexican officials and U.S. authorities, and the arrest of Octavio Leal Moncada, known as "El Profe" or "El Tarzán," in Santiago, Nuevo León. These events might indicate that pressure from the United States on Mexican authorities is increasing to compel the Mexican government to act against these criminal networks.
However, if the principal political actors remain associated with the MORENA party, the Mexican government continues to resist the extradition of Rubén Rocha Moya despite the ongoing investigations—even after Mexican authorities reportedly uncovered a network of companies allegedly operated by the Rocha Moya family to embezzle public funds—and progress in dismantling the cartels remains limited, these developments may ultimately result in broader sanctions against Mexico.
Sources: OFAC, FINCEN, BorderlandBeat
