How The Zetas' Were Doomed to Fail by their Violent Economic Model

"El Huaso" for Borderland Beat

Note to readers: Special thanks to "narcomappingmx" for sharing his work with Borderland Beat. This user is active in the forum page and presents some interesting contributions.

    In this paper, I will examine the leadership and economic reward structure of Los Zetas. In the early 2000s, this organization dominated Mexico's landscape as they fought the government and other cartels in bloody turf wars for control of Mexico’s extremely lucrative trafficking routes into the United States and Europe. I argue that the economic reward structure of Los Zetas, which highly valued displays of violence and built a brand of brutality, ultimately weakened their organization.

Founding of Los Zetas

    To examine the Zetas’ founding, it is vital to first address its parent organization, the Gulf Cartel, or Cartel del Golfo. The Gulf Cartel is one of the oldest Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in Mexico, tracing its founding back to Prohibition in the United States, when the Gulf Cartel smuggled liquor. Utilizing vast corruption networks and smuggling contacts in Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia, the Gulf Cartel maintained their control over the Northeast of Mexico in the ensuing decades, evolving into one of the largest cartels focused on trafficking cocaine, heroin and marijuana.

    In 1996, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, “The Friend Killer,” murdered one of his bosses and took the reins of the Gulf Cartel. Anticipating a power struggle and looming conflict, Guillen began building a private army. In the late 1990s, the Mexican Government began to take elevated notice of the violence caused by organized crime along the US/Mexico Border. The Secretariat of National Defense began to select and train Special Forces military units to combat the cartels. These units were trained in counter-insurgency operations in preparation for city combat against cartel gunmen. Even though they were members of the Mexican Military, many of these counter-insurgent troops were trained within the United States at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Osiel Cardenas Guillen

    The desertion of Mexican Federal troops into Los Zetas began with a Mexican special forces officer named Arturo Guzman Decena, “El Z1”. Guzman Decena was corrupted and received bribes from the Gulf Cartel for years, and when Guillen asked him in 1997 to build an armed wing for the Gulf Cartel, he handpicked 31 soldiers out of the Mexican Special Forces. This new armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, called Los Zetas, was tasked with several duties including the protection of Guillen, enforcing control of plazas, and carrying out hits. They were each tasked with bringing in and training more recruits (Grayson, 2). Propaganda efforts by Los Zetas focused on drawing in police officers and members of the Mexican armed forces, many of whom were easily won over by drastically better wages and opportunity for career progression. A narco-banner hung over a bridge in Reynosa, Tamaulipas in April of 2008 said:

“Grupo Operativo Los Zetas te quiere a ti, militar o ex militar. Te ofrecemos buen sueldo, comida y atenciones a tu familia. Ya no sufras maltratos y no sufras hambre. Nosotros no te damos de comer sopas Maruchan”.

“The Operations Group Los Zetas wants you, military or ex military. We offer a good salary, food, and will take care of your family. You will no longer be mistreated and will no longer go hungry. We won’t give you Maruchan (packaged noodles) to eat.”

    The joint organizations of Los Zetas and The Gulf Cartel began to call themselves “La Compania.” The Gulf Cartel focused primarily on trafficking narcotics from Central America into the United States as their armed wing “Los Zetas” cleared plazas and removed rivals. La Compania experienced incredible success in Mexico, where many of their opponents were unprepared and untrained for the heavily militarized and stunning violence employed by Los Zetas. By 2011, Los Zetas had presence in 17 out of 32 Mexican states, making them the most influential cartel in Mexico.

    Cardenas Guillen was captured by Mexican forces after a shootout in 2003. He was imprisoned in Mexico, but continued to run the Gulf Cartel operations from behind bars. He was extradited to the United States in 2007. Infighting ensued within La Compania as regional leaders fought for control of the organization. An ex officer of the Mexican Special Forces, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano “El Lazca” or “The Executioner”, the leader of Los Zetas took control of La Compania, and delegated different regions to various commanders of Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel. He consolidated Los Zetas power, pushing into other illicit markets. Los Zetas became a more business-minded organization. The DEA even claimed that they had a “business structure, with quarterly meetings, business ledgers, and even votes on key assassinations.”

    The two joint organizations continued to work together, although the power of Los Zetas continued to increase. Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and his second in command, former policeman Miguel Angel Trevino “El Z40” had tendencies for extreme violence, with Trevino being the more sadistic of the two. Together they built Los Zetas into the bloodiest cartel in Mexico. This concerned other Gulf leaders. Fissures began to appear within La Compania when some of the Gulf bosses became uneasy with the violence caused by Los Zetas which drew government attention.

    The fissure evolved into a rupture in 2010, when a regional Gulf boss, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez ``El Coss” kidnapped and killed a close Zeta associate of Trevino. Trevino demanded that Coss hand over the man responsible and threatened war if he did not. El Coss did not comply, and Trevino kidnapped and slaughtered 16 Gulf Cartel operators. This sparked a war in Northern Mexico as regional leaders picked sides. With their advanced weapons and tactics, Los Zetas pushed hard into their former bosses’ territory. By the end of 2010, the rupture was completed, and Los Zetas were an independent organization (Grayson, 198).

    Their independence came at a cost. The Gulf Cartel was a more established organization, and this new war meant they were now at war with the Sinaloa Cartel, another powerful organization to the west. Additionally, all of La Companias contacts in Central America for cocaine were with Gulf Cartel bosses. Los Zetas lacked these connections, and needed to establish new trafficking networks (Grayson, 23).

Los Zetas’ use of Extreme Violence as Propaganda

    No other cartel in the history of Mexican organized crime has been responsible for so many massacres as have Los Zetas. Los Zetas intentionally used this extreme violence to build their brand as the most brutal cartel in the nation. This reputation allowed them to enter dozens of illicit markets other than drug trafficking. In The Zetas Bad Omen, author and journalist Julie Lopez writes:

“Violence is used in the absence of power, in the words of Hannah Arendt, and the Zetas did just that. Lacking popular authority of traditional narco families (which bought communities’ silence by building clinics or paving streets, using selective violence when needed), the Zetas took territory by force.”

    The former Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna claimed that the rise in publicized executions could be attributed to the attention given to Al Qaeda executions in the Middle East. Los Zetas pioneered the use of social media to disseminate/ distribute threats and execution videos. During the 2000s, they uploaded videos of killings to YouTube, shared them on Facebook, and sent copies to newspapers. Often these would include interrogations of Police officers, rival drug dealers, or innocent bystanders. The 2000s were a turbulent time in Mexico. The splintering of larger groups created dozens of small cartels such as La Familia Michoacána, La Resistencia, Guerreros Unidos, and Los Zetas. These groups resorted to using social media and public murder to announce their entry into a market (“Tracking the steady rise of beheadings in Mexico”, InsightCrime).

    From their inception, Los Zetas have been committed to using violence to force compliance from authorities and politicians. The consequences were fatal for those who didn't. On June 8, 2005, Alejandro Dominguez Coello was appointed Chief of Police of the border city of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. As he was sworn in, he affirmed his incorruptibility saying: “I am not beholden to anyone. My commitment is to the citizenry.” Within six hours, he was ambushed as he was stopped at a red light, and assassinated by Los Zetas hitmen (Grayson, 15). In Zeta controlled territories, no one is safe from execution, even the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderon who was threatened by Zeta Commander Angel Trevino in 2007.

    When questioned about the death tolls from the Drug War, Felipe Calderon claimed that the deaths were primarily the result of cartel on cartel violence. This is true. However, with more cartels focusing on local revenues, this may be changing. The victims of Los Zetas are not purely rival hitmen. The illicit markets of extortion, kidnapping, and murder for hire all cause serious externalities. Testimony from captured Zetas responsible for disposing of bodies at Piedras Negras Prison, a Zetas disposal site, claimed that; “many of the victims were drug dealers for other cartels, people who owed money to the Zetas, and relatives of these groups. (...) They included men, women, elderly, children, and even a woman who was seven months pregnant” (Open Society Justice Initiative, 31).

    Los Zetas violence was also useful in ensuring that members would not provide information to the government, and that if they did, the authorities would not respond. This was exactly the case at the Allende massacre of 2011, where Los Zetas exacted vengeance on the families of former members whom they believed provided information to the government. Reports say 40-50 trucks entered the town of Allende, Coahuila and rounded up all citizens with the last names of their suspected turncoats. They were driven out to a ranch and executed. Government reports claim around 50 died, but captured Zetas claimed around 300 did. Prior to the attack, leaders of Los Zetas met with local police and told them that they would receive calls for help. They were not to respond or the same fate would befall their families (Open Society Justice Initiative, 26).

Diverse Economic Activities of Los Zetas

    The diversification of Los Zetas into many different markets was a survival tactic. Following their split from The Gulf Cartel, they had limited success acquiring cocaine from South America. Without this major income stream, they turned into local markets (Grayson, 23). Already in control in much of North Eastern Mexico, they only had to leverage their violent brand and armed control to impose other economic activities.

    As opposed to traditional narco trafficking, which requires a willing buyer for the product, Los Zetas model is imposed on its controlled territories through their military strength. They do not rely on foreign drug consumption markets for their income, but rather extract payment from local areas under their control.

The Zetas are not just violent because their leaders have a penchant for aggression — they follow an economic model that relies on controlling territory in a violent way. Within that territory, they extract rents from other criminal actors and move only a limited number of illegal goods via some of their own networks. (...) Without that territory, they have no rent (known in Mexico as “piso”). The Zetas are, in essence, parasites. Their model depends on their ability to be more powerful and violent than their counterparts, so they can extract this rent (“How the US Govt Gets It Wrong with the Zetas”, InsightCrime).

    Redlogarythm and MX, contributors to BorderlandBeat, call this trend the “Sicilianization” of cartels in Mexico, where criminal groups begin to diversify their economic pursuits. The days where these organizations are drug cartels is starting to fade, and is being replaced by smaller more holistic criminal groups. These groups, such as the Cartel Santa Rosa de Lima or the Sangre Nueva Zetas often lack the connections and routes to traffic narcotics, and resort to local criminal activities.

I. Fuel theft or “huachicol”

    Mexico's state oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) controls several vast crude oil pipelines which bring oil from the south of Mexico and distribute it around the nation. These extensive networks of crude oil pipelines attracted the attention of many criminal organizations, including Los Zetas. By tapping into the PEMEX pipelines, these criminals can extract millions of dollars’ worth of crude oil, which are then sold on the black market to civilians and Mexican and American firms (San Diego Tribune, 2009). This is a highly profitable business, and costs PEMEX around $1 billion USD annually. Los Zetas was the first cartel to take on this gas theft or “huachicol” in the 2010s when they split off from The Gulf Cartel.  Los Zetas established sophisticated surveillance and tracking systems to follow the movements of local PEMEX workers and Military units tasked with protecting them.

    Los Zetas has terrorized PEMEX workers into looking the other way and helping them at times. Over the past 10 years over 50 PEMEX workers have been kidnapped, and dozens more have been assassinated. The most noteworthy of these kidnappings occurred in 2007, when 38 PEMEX workers were kidnapped from the PEMEX refinery in Cadeteyra, Nuevo León, a Los Zetas stronghold city (“Vivos o Muertos los queremos de vuelta”, El Universal). The mass kidnappings and murders of workers sent a clear message to the locals; assist, step aside, or else. Los Zetas’ focus on the workers of PEMEX has caused the Mexican government to establish bases and assign military units to escort the workers, with limited success (Proceso, 2013).

II. Extortion

    There are well documented cases of Los Zetas systemic involvement in two forms of extortion. The first is called “cobro de piso” or “floor charge.” This is the crime where businesses are forced to pay a sum of money in exchange for operating in a cartel's territory. Sometimes this extortion operates under the guise of protection money, where the cartel will pledge to protect the business from thieves or other threats (ReporteIndigo, 2012). The second form of extortion is kidnapping. This can be either true kidnapping, where victims are captured and held until ransom money is paid, or express kidnapping, where the victim is captured, usually in a car, and forced to withdraw cash from an ATM with their bank card before they are released.

    Los Zetas reached global headlines and international outrage after several high-profile mass abductions of undocumented Central American migrants. Los Zetas took advantage of the thousands of undocumented migrants who have left the economically and politically unstable nations of Central America. Undocumented, and uncontrolled, they are largely unprotected by the Mexican government. Starting in the late 2000s, Los Zetas took advantage of these caravans. They would ambush them in armed groups, round them up, and drive them into rural Mexico. They were forced to join Los Zetas or call family members back home and demand ransom for their lives. Those who couldn't pay were killed en masse. This led to several discoveries of massacres of migrants, including the San Fernando massacres of 2010 and 2011, where 72 and 193 migrants were found dead (SSP, 3:49).

    The kidnapping and ransom of migrants has been a key focus of Los Zetas. It is a highly profitable illicit market, and often holds very little risk, due to the lack of documentation and ability of the government to track migrant caravans.

III. Counterfeit Goods

    The production and selling of counterfeit goods in Mexico is a large contributor to the nation’s massive underground economy. A study by the Mexican Chamber of Commerce revealed that 8 out of 10 Mexicans have purchased pirated goods. (Observatorio Nacional, 20:12) This taste for counterfeit goods costs the Mexican economy over $2 billion USD per year. Organized crime is responsible for much of these counterfeit goods. The production is often controlled by larger organizations, and the individual street vendors purchase their stock from these suppliers. Individual buyers often also support organized crime through “cobro de piso”, payments to local crime groups for selling on their turf.

    Los Zetas were heavily involved in the sale and importation of counterfeit goods. One officer within Los Zetas, Gregorio Villanueva Salas, was nicknamed the “The Czar of Piracy” for the ability of his criminal cell to produce 58 million pirated CDs and movies a year. When he was captured in Matamoros, Tamaulipas in 2012, police found a workshop dedicated to creating counterfeit discs. These goods were then shipped south into the center of Mexico, where they were sold in street markets in Jalisco and Mexico City, two hot spots of counterfeit goods (Proceso, 2017).

Gregorio Villanueva Salas, 'The Czar of Piracy'

How does this violence affect the stability of Los Zetas?

    The grotesque violence of Los Zetas, as seen in the San Fernando Massacres of 2010 and 2011 or the Cadereyta Jiménez massacre of May 12, 2012, are intended as acts of terror and intimidation. They are successful in gaining recruits and dismaying opponents, but also gain mass international and Mexican federal attention. This attention causes increased law enforcement focus, which is a threat to the stability of a DTO. An example of this was various other DTOs' responses to Los Zetas in the late 2000s. In 2007, the Sinaloa cartel created an armed wing called “Los Matazetas”, the “Zeta Killers” to fight Los Zetas in Veracruz, Mexico (Excelsior, 2018). The Beltran Leyva Organization, also a significant criminal group at the time in Mexico, created their own armed wing “Los Negros”. These were the first of several multi cartel coalitions against Los Zetas. In February of 2010, narco banners hung up in five states of Central Mexico dictated:

"Atenta invitación a toda la sociedad mexicana a unirse a un frente común para acabar con Los Zetas. Nosotros ya estamos actuando contra Los Zetas, y próximamente seremos La Familia Mexicana. “Vamos todos juntos contra las bestias del mal: La Familia Michoacana, Grupo Resistencia, Milenio, Golfo y las Familias Guerrerense, Guanajuatense y Mexiquense”

"A courteous invitation to all mexican society to unite in a common front to get rid of Los Zetas. We are acting against Los Zetas, soon we will be the Familia Michoacana. “Join us all against the evil beasts: (we are) La Familia Michoacana, Grupo Resistencia, Milenio, Golfo y las Familias Guerrerense, Guanajuatense y Mexiquense. (Cronica, 2010)”

Particularly in Michoacan, locals banded together to form “autodefensas”; armed community defense groups to fight the incursion of Los Zetas into their communities. Through strong local support, these groups were successful in pushing Los Zetas out of the state of Michoacan.

Government Response to Los Zetas

    The economic model of Los Zetas caused intense scrutiny. Large massacres and shootouts often create international outrage, as seen after the San Fernando Massacre of 2010. This attention caused the Mexican government to investigate and start a manhunt for the responsible Zetas. By June 2011, the Federal Police had captured 81 Zeta members involved in the massacre, including Édgar Huerta Montiel “El Wache”, the Zeta commander in charge of the operation. In March of 2009, the Attorney General’s Office of Mexico; la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) released a list of the 37 most wanted cartel leaders. Of that list 14 were members of Los Zetas. In comparison, only 5 of the most wanted were members of the rival Sinaloa Cartel, who controlled the same amount of land.

The results of their economic model

    Miguel Angel Trevino, the Zetas commander, was rumored to drive around at night, pointing at random pedestrians for his hitmen to kill. This is in contrast to rivals of Los Zetas, The Sinaloa Federation, in particular “El Chapo”, stress to their plaza bosses that plazas under control of the Sinaloa cartel must remain peaceful (NYT, 2012). In fact, petty criminals such as drug dealers or thieves are often captured and punished by plaza bosses in order to keep crime down.

    The Zetas are diversified; involved in money laundering, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, prostitution, counterfeit goods, kidnapping, extortion, and gas theft (huachicoleo). Los Zetas’ business model relies on earning economic rent by dominating their local plaza. Examination of the massive outcries from Zeta activities, and the ensuing crackdowns indicates  that their economic model directly harms their long term stability. This is important for the stability of an organization, as the government will work harder to dismantle organizations who clearly harm their communities. The mass violence and murder resulting from Los Zetas’ economic model draws the focus of rival cartels and law enforcement on a national scale. This causes intense crackdowns, which contribute to the instability of the organization.

Works Cited

Carrizales, D. (2015, August 13). Cadereyta: "Vivos o muertos los querems de vuelta". Retrieved November 03, 2020, from https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2015/impreso/cadereyta-8220vivos-o-muertos-los-queremos-de-vuelta-8221-97341.html

Corcoran, P. (2017, October 06). Zetas Arrest Shows Mid-Level Commanders' Capacity for Mayhem. Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/zetas-arrest-shows-mid-level-commanders-capacity-for-mayhem/

Davila, P. (2012, June 14). Presentan en la SIEDO a "El Zar de la Pirater. Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/2012/6/14/presentan-en-la-siedo-el-zar-de-la-pirateria-104191.html

Declara "El Wache" sobre caso San Fernando, DEMOS Desarrollo de Medios S.A. de C.V. Interview by Secretariat de Seguridad Publica, Policia Federal. [Video file]. (2011, June). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UycQ0P9jCts

Detienen a 18 presuntos zetas por robo de hidrocarburos a Pemex. (2013, April 13). Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/2013/4/29/detienen-18-presuntos-zetas-por-robo-de-hidrocarburos-pemex-117619.html\

Entrevista a el Mamito, presunto fundador de los Zetas, Cosultants and Promotional Services. Video from CNN Mexico, Interview by Secretariat de Seguridad Publica, Policia Federal.[Video file]. (2011, July 6). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HacDTEn2TDs

Flores, R. (2018, February 10). CJNG lidera trasiego de drogas a EU; nació como Los Matazetas. Retrieved November 03, 2020, from https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2018/02/10/1219402

Jones, Nathan P., and John P. Sullivan. “Huachicoleros: Criminal Cartels, Fuel Theft, and Violence in Mexico.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 12, no. 4, 2019, pp. 1–24. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26851258. Accessed 7 Nov. 2020.

Grayson, George W. THE EVOLUTION OF LOS ZETAS IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: SADISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CARTEL WARFARE. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2014, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11767. Accessed 7 Nov. 2020.

Gutiérrez, H. (2012, August 28). Los demonios andan sueltos. Retrieved November 05, 2020, from https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/los-demonios-andan-sueltos/

La extorsión, una realidad 'aceptada' por algunas empresas en México. (2016, February 15). Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://expansion.mx/nacional/2013/04/08/la-extorsion-una-realidad-aceptada-por-las-empresas-en-mexico

Lopez, J. (2012). The Zetas' Bad Omen. Retrieved November 04, 2020, from https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/zetas%E2%80%99-bad-omen

Pachico, E., & Dudley, S. (2017, October 06). Why a Zetas Split is Inevitable. Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/why-a-zetas-split-is-inevitable/

Pachico, Elyssa, et al. “Tracking the Steady Rise of Beheadings in Mexico.” InSight Crime, 6 Oct. 2017, www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracking-the-steady-rise-of-beheadings-in-mexico/. 

Press, T. (2009, April 01). Mexico says gang sold stolen oil to US refineries. Retrieved. December 14, 2020, from https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-lt-mexico-oil-theft-033109-2009mar31-story.html

Osorno, Diego. “COMER EN UN CAMPAMENTO DE LOS ZETAS.” Milenio Diario de Monterrey, July, 6, 2020. http://nuestraaparenterendicion.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=410:comer-en-un-campamento-de-los-zetas&Itemid=104&tmpl=component&print=1

ROQUE MADRIZ, I. (2010, February 2). Aparecen más narcomantas de La Familia contra Los Zetas. Retrieved November 08, 2020, from http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2010/485678.html

Salas, D., Salas, M., Ugalde, A., Jaramillo, L., & Castro, H. (2020, July). Pirateria en Mexico: Diagnostico de la oferta y de las acciones institucionales. Retrieved October 28, 2020, from https://onc.org.mx/uploads/190820-PirateriaMx-doc.pdf

Semple, K. (2019, July 12). Migrants in Mexico Face Kidnappings and Violence While Awaiting Immigration Hearings in U.S. Retrieved November 07, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/americas/mexico-migrants.html

Beittel, June S. Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2020.

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf

Daugherty, Arron, and Steven Dudley. “How the US Govt Gets It Wrong with the Zetas.” InSight Crime, 17 Oct. 2017, www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/us-govt-gets-it-wrong-mexico-zetas-leaders/. 

Redlogarythm. “The Economics of Drug Prices or Why the War on Drugs Is Failing.” Borderland Beat, Aug 29, 2020. www.borderlandbeat.com/2020/08/the-economics-of-drug-prices-or-why-war.html.

Salcedo-Albarán, Eduardo & Salamanca, Luis. (2014). Structure of a Transnational Criminal Network: “Los Zetas” and the Smuggling of Hydrocarbons.

REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA, USCG. Quote from: U.S. Congress. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION. "COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION." (JUNE 10, 1998). Text from: Federation of American Scientists. ttps://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/h980610-riutta.htm; Accessed 11/20/2020.

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Zetas: Pancho Colorado wins another appeal, his bribery conviction is tossed out

by Lucio R. Borderland Beat

At the close of the Austin Texas Zetas Money Laundering trial, a stunning addendum intruded the Austin courthouse, when prosecutors made aware the business partner and the son of defendant Francisco “Pancho” Colorado Cessa, [below left] had attempted to execute a scheme that would bribe a U.S. District Court judge, on behalf of Colorado, for a favorable sentence.

In another one of those situations which could have easily been created in Hollywood, Francisco Colorado Jr. and Ramon Segura attempted to bribe the presiding judge, planning to pay him 1 million USD.

Judge Sparks was never aware of the scheme.  The plot included; an informant, secret meetings with undercover agents, code words and a fictitious story by the agents saying the judge had accepted the deal.

Colorado Jr. and Seguro pleaded guilty in exchange for Cessa receiving a light sentence, of about one year.  They were released and deported to Mexico, where they promptly declared they were railroaded by the U.S. government and were innocent.

For his part Cessa pleaded with the judge to punish him but allow his son to go free.  He then pleaded guilty.  He attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, but the presiding judge, in the bribery case, Donald Walter, ruled against Cessa rescinding his plea, saying “he had implicitly accepted the plea agreement”, thereby was prevented from repealing the agreement.

He was sentenced to 5 years. 

But a federal 5th U.S. Circuit Court of appeals, found in disagreement with the presiding judge, concluding that he had the right to rescind the plea agreement.

The conviction was overturned.

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Zetas: Victoria Plaza Chief Captured in Guanajuato

Tamaulipas  secretary general, Herminio Garza Palacios, confirmed that Luis Jimenez Tovar, aka“Cabeza de Marrano”, was   arrested Friday in the city of Leon  Guanajuato, he was a Zetas leader in Victoria, Tamaulipas.

At a press conference in the hall of the Palace of Independence Government said the  detainee acted as a subordinate of one of the main leaders of a criminal group.

At the time of his arrest was travelling in a vehicle and carrying a long gun and a short exclusive use of the Armed Forces.

Addressing representatives of the Ministries of National Defense (Department of Defense), the Navy of Mexico (Semar), Attorney General's Office (PGR), Federal and State police announced that " information indicates that Jimenez Tovar was one of the principal sources of violence in Tamaulipas state. "

The suspect is identified as suspected of being  responsible for the crimes of kidnapping and murder, most recently,  his alleged involvement in the kidnapping of a family in Victoria, for which a ransom was demanded of  five million pesos in exchange for their release.

May 5th

On May 5, 2014, he was in a violent clash with state police, but he was able to flee. Subsequently through third parties, Jimenez Tovar and another person spread information  on the internet of  their supposed deaths, from injuries sustained in the shootout,   to deceive  authorities and stop the search for him.

On June 20 in Ciudad Victoria, federal forces arrested five members of the same criminal group, including Juan Alberto Rodríguez Padilla, who was in possession of  more than six million pesos and $ 43,000 in cash.

Jimenez Tovar had retreated to the city of Leon, Guanajuato, as many key Zetas have done, due to the heavy presence of feds in the state implemented by the new security strategy for  Tamaulipas. The retreat is know as the "cockroach' effect.

Note (thanks Pepe)

Within one hour of the announcement of the arrest of Jiménez Tovar in Leon GTO Thursday night, there were two separate shootings in the city, resulting in the deaths of three. Later that night four were arrested for the attacks, three men and a woman.

Sources say the killings are associated with the arrest of Jiménez Tovar. In the first killing, two men drove up in pickup beside a Honda SUV with two men and several family members. The men in the pick-up fired on the Honda, killing the two men inside and wounding the others. In the second attack, one man was killed and another injured in a vehicle with Puebla plates, after gunmen opened fire on their vehicle.

 Excelsior, El Manana-el economista and NTR used for this post

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Mexico's First Openly Gay Mayor says Fighting Cartels is a Priority

The first openly gay mayor in Mexico's history has been sworn in at a ceremony in city of Fresnillo.

Benjamin Medrano said his sexuality only became an issue in the electoral campaign when the opposition tried to use it against him in conservative Zacatecas state.

The city has been caught up in a turf war between drug cartels operating in central and northern Mexico.

Mr Medrano says he hopes to make a difference for the people of Fresnillo.He posted a message on his Twitter account soon after the ceremony: "The time has come to listen to your demands and address your problems. I have a commitment with you."

 Two of Mexico's biggest criminal organizations - Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel - have been fighting for control of drug trafficking routes leading north towards the American border.

Mr Medrano said the fact that he has no involvement with criminal organisations would enable him to do a good job for the people of Fresnillo.

"What matters the least for the people is who you may sleep with, what you do in your private life. What they want is good results from their politicians," he told BBC Mundo.

Gay marriage
Mr Medrano comes from a very poor background in Zacatecas state. He went to the United States aged six, as part of an "artistic caravan."

He returned to Mexico after many years to finish school and to read law at university.  He began a professional career as a singer and opened Fresnillo's first gay nightclub.

A Roman Catholic in a very conservative part of Mexico, he says he has no intention of getting married.

He denied being against gay marriage, but hinted that what is acceptable in the capital, Mexico City, and other regions of the country may not be acceptable in Zacatecas.

"My agenda is based on achieving human and social development for all of us who live in Fresnillo, regardless of sexual orientation," he told BBC Mundo. Security is the main concern of the population of Fresnillo, a city of some 200,000 inhabitants.

Security is the main concern of the population of Fresnillo, a city of some 200,000 inhabitants. "First, we need to get our police better equipped and better trained, so they don't become accomplices of the criminal gangs," said Mr Medrano.

He was elected mayor for the centre-right Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) of President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December promising to review the "war on drugs" policy of his predecessor.

BBC

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Zetas Money Laundering Trial-Story Behind the Story and Courtroom Notes

by Havana and Chivis Martínez for Borderland Beat

U.S Attorney Team

Notes from the courtroom

The Austin, Texas federal courtroom filled early and soon faced a blur of facts, initials, figures, names of horses, stables, races, LLCs, informants, and so much previously presented testimony all heads were spinning and emotions frazzled. Standing room was not allowed, so there was a jockeying for the limited seats, and even for press, who had to follow the strictly enforced rule of no electronics in the courtroom.

For over a year and a half,  Judge Sam Sparks remarked; he'd worked the case lugging around more paper than he could carry and by the look of his courtroom podium no one doubted it.

Sentence recommendations precede the sentencing hearings, filed both by defense and prosecution teams, however, sentencing hearings are mini trials in themselves, with evidence, and testimony presented.  Eleven convicted defendants and over forty attorneys were a part of the long process.

There was much talk about the dollar amount funneled through the quarter horse operation as being a very conservative estimate.  The US attributed it to the sophistication of the Zetas money laundering scheme. If factors didn't add up 100% proof, it was not included. Judge Sparks commented that even if the dollar figure might have been relatively conservative, there was overwhelming resounding amount of evidence to convict the participants.

At one point Sparks marveled, "one of the remarkable things about this case is that not one of the defendants had a criminal history and they participated in it for greed, fear or intimidation."

Ramon Segura was the first witness whose  testimony was supposed to help lighten Francisco Colorado Cessa’s lengthy sentence.

Before the court Ramon Segura Flores stated he was a founding member of ADT Petrolservicios in 2001, so obviously, Francisco Cessa Colorado's business partner. While working for ADT from 2002-2007, Segura’s job was procuring RFPs, fulfilling contracts and tracking income. He purchased machinery and said all of Pemex money was deposited directly into the " Bancomer  #989835 account." "I handled all acquisitions and knew about all the funds to cover them"

When asked about Pemex's corruption, he said "that is something I cannot comment on, I just do my job.....I was aware of their reorganization because of corruption within Pemex and aware of money awarded to fulfill my contracts." 

Segura discounted a referred to 6 million loan from Efrain Torres aka Z14 as something very traceable, that more or less couldn't have happened under his watchful eye. And the 50 million given to Colorado Cessa, he was not aware of either.

Ramon Segura said he speaks daily with Colorado Cessa and has not been involved in fraudulent activities for the company. When asked by the prosecution if he participated if he participated in criminal activities for Colorado Cessa, he replied no but was reminded by Assistant US Attorney, Michelle Fernald that he was under oath.  He acknowledged that and was adamant when repeating “no”.

There was much discounting of testimony by the defense throughout the trial and also continuing on the first day of sentencing by the defense on the familiar subject of information provided from confidential informants to the government. One of Colorado Cessa's lawyers (Sanchez Ross) asked the witness for the prosecution, Scott Lawson, about El Pitufo's  credibility, an infamous informant, having testified in numerous cases  (over 80 cases) and is living boarded by the Office of Attorney General with a $5,000 a month salary. El Pitufo was initially going to be used by the American government in this case but was not used.

Case FBI Investigator Scott Lawson and Steve Pennington, criminal investigator for the IRS each took the stand, one after the other for the government.  Scott Lawson went over previous testimony in the case reminding us that testimony showed that two businessmen had been killed by the Zetas for cooperation in this case.

It was sobering to learn Victor Lopez; an integral part of the case had been killed by the Zetas for cooperating with authorities. 

Victor Lopez picked up some of the slack after Carlos Nayen returned to Mexico.  Lopez set up LLCs with Fernando Solis Garcia and was deeply involved in money structuring, as well as smuggling cash over the border for payments to Southwest Stallion in Elgin Texas. 

Additionally, there was previous testimony, a massive paper trail, and  photos of his flying from Laredo to Oklahoma for a money drop and returning to Laredo in the same day. Lawson testified Treviño told the Zetas that Lopez attracted attention. Lopez was detained in March 2012 and provided information to the Government. 

Lawson told the court Victor Lopez was later killed.

On Friday morning a breaking news event quickly overshadowed the sentencing hearings, when it was revealed that Segura and Francisco Colorado Cessa Jr. were arrested in a charge of attempting to bribe  the judge in Francisco seniors case, for 1.2 Million dollars.

That made Thursday’s little back and forth between a U.S. Attorney and Segura, during his testimony, more relevant.  Having declared, under oath,  that he had never participated in illegal activities with Colorado Cessa. 

 Hours later Segura and Colorado’s son were arrested in the bribery case.

On Friday at the Colorado/Segura bribery preliminary hearing, Judge Austin told the defendants   as he was referring to the charges on the affidavit that they had the right to an attorney; Ramon Segura replied offhandedly, "I don't understand US Law."

Then he added he was trying to retain Colorado Cessa's attorney, Mike DeGeurin, as was

Francisco Colorado Jr. It was suggested they might want to alert the Mexican Consulate of their crime as was typically done in similar instances or they could have their lawyer attend to it. They both said they would leave that to their attorney.

Commenting on the bribery case, U.S. Attorney Robert Pitman said;  "The latest allegation, if proven, demonstrates that individuals associated with the most violent drug cartel believe that they can corrupt what we hold as the bedrock of American justice - the United States Courts," said U.S. Attorney Robert Pitman said in a statement.

"We are one step ahead of them and if they continue to try to function as they do in Mexico, we will find them, we will stop them, and we will do whatever it takes to ensure that they are punished to the full extent of the law."

Sentencing

 Adan Farias represented by Daniel Wannamaker Sentenced to 3 years’ probation 3600 dollar fine.

Farias, of Norco California, a bedroom community of ranches and horse stables in southern California, is a top notch horse trainer, his company LA Horses was a success, but far from the aspirations he once held of becoming an FBI agent.  Some around Los Alamitos Race Track say his success in the last 2 ½ years of his career, at the minimum, were the result of running his horses doped on zilpaterol. 

As with many of the peripheral characters of the Zetas saga,   there is as much to make an argument for Farias being a sympathetic character, as there is to frame him as a scoundrel.

For starters the doping, secondly, 11 dead horses in 2 ½ years, racing horses in his care.

Yet his supporters point to his actions before the Zetas, a professional, driven, hardworking, a family man, willing to give of himself in charitable causes, creating a youth program.

In 2011, a 17 year old boy named Emanuel connected with the ‘Make A Wish Foundation’ saying his dream was to meet his idols, Paul Jones and  Adan Farias. Farias spent a day with Emanuel.  This was a year before his ‘idol’ had his license revoked for doping.

Farias was contacted by Carlos Nayen, who eventually contracted Farias to train 10 Zetas horses in the United States.  Nayen asked Farias to travel to Mexico to meet someone Nayen referred to as “The Boss”.

 

Nayen was deep in the Zetas U.S. operations, drugs, weapons, money laundering and every aspect of the Zetas quarter horse operation. Nayen’s boss Miguel Treviño, wanted the best trainers for his horses, and Farias was a star in the field of quarter horse training.

On a June day in 2010, he travelled from SoCal to San Antonio where he was picked up by Nayen’s people and driven to the border.  He hadn’t a clue who the people were who were taking him, where he was going, or who this “boss” was, a man that Nayen once referred to as”40”.  He did later report that he felt an uncomfortable feeling, a  leeriness from the time he was picked up in San Antonio.....continues on next page

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'Mamito' Pleads Guilty in U.S.

Borderland Beat

High-Ranking Member of Mexican “Los Zetas” Cartel Pleads Guilty to Drug Conspiracy Charges Jesus Enrique Rejon Aguilar, aka “Mamito” and “Caballero,” a high ranking member of the “Los Zetas” drug cartel, pleaded guilty today to conspiracy to import multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana into the United States, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Administrator Michele M. Leonhart of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Rejon Aguilar, 36, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Barbara J. Rothstein in the District of Columbia.  Rejon Aguilar was extradited to the United States in September 2012 and was ordered detained in federal custody pending trial.

On Nov. 4, 2010, Rejon Aguilar and 19 co-defendants were charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to manufacture and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana for importation into the United States. 

The indictment charges that between 2000 and 2010, members of Los Zetas, including Rejon Aguilar, engaged in a conspiracy with members of the Gulf Cartel in an arrangement referred to as the “Company” to import drugs into the United States.  Rejon Aguilar was an original member of Los Zetas and held a high ranking position with the Company.

 “As a leader of the Company’s drug trafficking operation, Rejon Aguilar ensured that mass quantities of cocaine and marijuana were brought into the United States for distribution,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. 

“The Justice Department is committed to working with its law enforcement partners to bring cartel members and associates to justice for their crimes.”                                                    

 

“As an original and high-ranking member of the Los Zetas cartel, Jesus Enrique Rejon Aguilar was responsible for funneling massive amounts of marijuana and cocaine into the United States while using violence to intimidate anyone that stood in his way,” said DEA Administrator Leonhart.

 “Rejon Aguilar’s plea today was possible only with the strength and power of international law enforcement cooperation.  DEA, along with our Mexican counterparts, are committed to bringing violent criminals like Rejon Aguilar, to justice.”

According to the indictment, the Company transported shipments of cocaine and marijuana by motor vehicles from Mexico to cities in Texas for distribution to other cities within the United States. 

The indictment alleges that Rejon Aguilar, his co-defendants and others organized, directed and carried out various acts of violence to retaliate against and to intimidate anyone who interfered with, or who were perceived to potentially interfere with, the cocaine and marijuana trafficking activities of the Company......continues on next page

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Is Piedras the Next Juarez?

Chivis Martinez Borderland Beat

 

6 Dead 1 survivor critical and two children taken in latest incident
Texas sheriff says the border town is the new Juarez.

Piedras Negras; Four bodies were discovered in a taxi, while the other two died in a second incident and  found in a house in the Colonia Acoros.
 

Santos Vasquez Estrada the delegate of the Attorney General of Northern Coahuila reported that at 4:30 am the Taxi was located on the old road to Zaragoza, about a mile from the urban are. Onboard  were 4 males and 2 females with gun shots.

In the back seat of the taxi were found two women with gun shots while the taxi driver and front passenger also had gun shot wounds.

He said the taxi driver was identified as Fabian Martinez Ibarra 35 years while the other companions were unidentified.

In the second incident,  two people died in the Colony Acoros from stab wounds, the authority identified Josefina Puneda Tamez, 49, and Oscar Pineda Oziel Gobea 19,  a third was stabbed but survived. Gobea Ignacio Vazquez, husband of the deceased, who is in critical condition.

It was reported that two children ages 3 and 5 years  were kidnapped but later found wandering the streets in a nearby colonia .  The home that came under attack was at Tule Street # 1306 of Acoros Cologne.

Piedras Negras has become a hot spot in the Mexican drugwar.  The Mexican city shares a border with  Eagle Pass Texas.  Logistically sitting in a prime location  at the POE into Texas in Northeastern Coahuila  and connects with many major highways running through the south, west, east of Mexico feeding into Piedras and into the US.  

Zetas and government forces have intensified presence, complicated by the apparent growing presence of the SInaloa Cartel.

Last week both Federal Police and the Coahuila GATES agency sent additional convoys of troops to the area, focusing in Piedras Negras.

 

The Zetas Cartel have enjoyed a comfortable presense and control of the state of Coahuila since they split from the Golfo Cartel in 2010.  Golfos, also known as CDG, can take "credit" for the creation of the violent Zetas as they recruited the group as an enforcer wing of CDG together the two groups called themselves "La Compañía".

Until the split, La Compañía controlled the state of Coahuila.  After the split Zetas gained control of the majority of the state.  Seemingly, with collusion from Saltillo, the media and municipalities. 

It is surreal to live in a Coahuila city where everyone knows who the Zs are, where they live, where safe houses are, easy to spot halcones, and just about anyone can take a visitor to places such as staging lots filled with stolen boats, and vehicles of all types, mostly with Texas license plates.  But, few speak of it, paralyzed by fear.  That is changing, slowly but steadily people are beginning to speak of it with friends.  But the openess of narco activity exists and has changed little.

It seems the new governor does not want to be completely married to the Zs, or perhaps wants an open marriage of sorts.  and that sparked the struggle that was inevitable when a party refuses to play ball within Zetas rules.

Ruben Moriera, is the current governor,  Ruben is the brother of Humberto Moreira, former governor who resigned to make a successful run for the chairmanship of the PRI party. Only to resign in disgrace when improprieties were made public of missing Coahuila funds

Much is spoken about Humberto's governorship and agreements he made with the Zetas.  Violence was abound but few spoke about the many “disappeared” or dead, including the Coahuila press of which the Moreira’s have a large investment in newspaper and radio outlets.  Zetas have the last say of what narco news regional newspapers run.  For the killings reported, many times more go unreported.  The fact of the matter is that Coahuila has never maintained an official count of drug deaths or disappearances.

Because of the lack of media coverage and official counts, estimation is the method used to tally deaths and kidnappings.  The government of Mexico has concluded that Coahuila may have the most "missing" persons, a reasonable person would insist surely it is one of the top 3 or 4 states that have high numbers of kidnapped persons never to be seen again. If one looks at the Coahuila map it reflects a large land mass, but it has a small  population rendering large masses of land that are vacant undeveloped and many prime locations to dump bodies. (see maps on page two)

In Acuña, in one violent week while Humberto was governor, terror gripped the city, as kidnappings and killings erupted in a narco rampage.  Buildings and homes burned to the ground-fire fighters were warned not to attempt to extinguish the fires, or pay with their lives-the chief of police was killed left with a narco message in the parking lot of a large candy warehouse, torched and destroyed.

Though citizens witnessed the violence around the city, not a word of the violence was reported  on the radio, television or Coahuila newspapers.  For three days, no reporting then finally a report of the chief, but little else.  Fast forward to October 2012, the night of Lalo Moreira's murder, Lalo is Humberto's son.  Hours after the murder four men were killed and thrown into the Bravo, on the Acuña side of the river. 

One victim was not dead ,and despite being handcuffed, he managed to drift to the Del Rio side of the river where Border Patrol watching the events unfold, rescued the man  and took him to the hospital.  Upon his release he was kept in GEO for deportation processing.  The name he gave was "Jesus Piña".  A strange thing is Jesus is a dead ringer for Victor Sifueñtes- the police supervisor wanted for Lalo's murder- and when parties connected to the "Jesus" case were shown  Victor's photo they made a positive ID as he being the man in the river calling himself "Jesus Piña.. 

Victor had disappeared directly after "finding" Lalo's corpse and was on the run for weeks.  "Jesus" was deported, then  Victor was apprehended in the Coahuila city of Monclova..  When he was picked up Victor's face still bore the injuries and scabbing consistent with Jesus' injuries sustained from  his late night encounter in the Bravo, just hours after Lalo's killing.

None of this was reported in Mexican news. However, the story of the 4 bodies dumped in the Bravo was in the Del Rio Herald, stating the bodies were dumped on the Acuna side.  Four bodies and not a word written about it in Coahuila nor Mexico.  It is evident that Coahuila is no better off with Rueben Moreira.  Corruption is still very much alive and thriving in Coahuila. 

Ruben made the decision to send forces and fortify  the border town of Piedras Negras. Zs did not take kindly to that action, and successfully executed a mass prison escape from the Piedras Prison of 131 inmates.  When most inmates stayed close to and in the area it was obvious they were freed to defend Zeta ground. 

About and hour west of Piedras lies the border town of Acuña, adjacent to Del Rio Texas.  It was in this relatively peaceful city that all hell broke loose, pitting governor on governor, brothers on brother, split a powerful family, killed a nephew in retribution for the GATES killing of the nephew of Miguel Treviño aka Z40 leader of the Zetas.


Humberto left stands next to his brother Ruben



Lalo Moreira

In early October  in a conflict with GATES 4 gunmen were killed in Piedras Negras. One of the dead gunmen was the nephew of Miguel Trevino, his name; Alejandro Treviño Chavez.  This incensed Z40 who ordered a hit on one of the Moreira family members.

Banners began appearing in the region almost immediately.  This was confirmed by Carlos  younger brother Ruben and Humberto.  The banners warned "Family for Family" and were signed Z40. Jose Eduardo Moreira was the most vulnerable.  He was the son of Humberto and known as "Lalo".  Lalo lived in Acuña with his wife and infant son, he was 25 years old.

His dead body was found in his truck 24 hours after Z40s nephew was killed in Piedras.

The absence of Ruben at Lalo's funeral  brought to light the severity of the estrangement of the once close brothers.  Followed by accusations by the young widow holding the governor culpable in the death of her husband. 

Stating that Ruben knew of the warnings and did nothing to protect Lalo,  even though he knew he was defenseless as one month prior Lalo's armor truck and state police body guards were taken from him with the governors order for the municipal police to fill the roll of body guards.  Ironic, as it was the police chief, and supervisor on duty that were two of the 6 men suspected of Lalo's murder, the chief has already confessed to the killing.

If the relationship between the two governors ever had a chance in hell of mending after that, the fate was sealed when Ruben said it was El Lazca, the other premier leader of the Zetas at the time of Lalo's death, as the one who ordered the Lalo's murder.  Convenient, since Lazcano is now deceased.  Ruben announced the "case closed".

No one believed the governor's announcement and the action incensed the Humberto Moreira family further.  This time Lalo's younger brother took to Twitter to accuse his uncle Ruben of being a liar.

Blame the dead guy-an often use tactic to close cases

In the weeks that followed, police and army presence increased in Acuña and Piedras, Zetas retreated from Acuña seemingly to concentrate on Piedras.  Meanwhile as this heavy deployment in to the area by federal and state forces with the intent to fight off the Zetas and maintain peace, rumors of CDS presense growing both in Acuña and Piedras.  The rumors have been persistent.

-click on read more below for page 2-

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